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Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright:
Property Rights or Cultural Progress?

KENNETH D. CREWS"

INTRODUCTION

A leading force shaping United States copyright law in recent decades has
been the desire to conform U.S. law to the laws of other countries where many
American companies and individuals in the copyright industries frequently
pursue business.' Those countries are often in Western Europe, where U.S.
publishers, film producers, software developers, and others regularly make
sales. One may look to trends and developments in other countries to see the
future ofU.S. copyright. The "harmonization" of laws has brought the promise
of predictability and ease of conducting business across national borders.'

* Kenneth D. Crews (B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Washington University; Ph.D., University
of California, Los Angeles) is an Associate Professor in the Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis
and the IU School of Library and Information Science. He is also Associate Dean ofthe Faculties for Copyright
Management. Email address: kcrews@indiana.edu. Copyright 1998, Kenneth D. Crews. The author would
like to thank his colleague at Indiana University, Professor Fred Cate, for inviting him to join the roundtable
on "Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property." He is especially grateful to the other
participants who commented on this paper and gave many valuable insights, including Jerome Reichman of
Vanderbilt University, Trotter Hardy of the College of William and Mary, Keith Aoki of the University of
Oregon, and Marshall Leaffer of Indiana University. Bringing this paper to its final, published form has
required yet other important support. Becky Parman, assistant in the IU Copyright Management Center,
deployed her word-processing skills to produce the early drafts, and Dwayne Buttler, one of the author's law
students who now works in the Center, read the manuscript while in progress and provided important comments.
Jennifer Garrett and the other editors of this Journal exhibited endless patience and care as they brought this
work to publication. Much of the labor of research, however, was greatly improved and expedited by the
enthusiastic and tireless contributions ofa graduate student in the IU School ofLibrary and Information Science,
Ms. Noemi Rivera-Morales. Her contributions strengthened the paper throughout and allowed the author to
meet the generously extended deadlines for completion.
1. William Belanger, US. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEo. MASON L. REv. 373, 373
(1995) (noting that changes in global trade have led to international protections for intellectual property).
2. See, e.g., Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright Harmonization in the European Union and in North
America, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 37 (1995); David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation,
Harmonization: An InternationalCopyright Proposalfor the UnitedStates, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
2, Spring 1992, at 211. Harmonization has also been important in an era of multinational computer networks
and instant communication and business transactions. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's
DemocraticPrinciples in the GlobalArena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 312-13 (1998).
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However, this harmonization also has brought distinct change to U.S. law in
ways contrary to the fundamental purposes of copyright law and its social
objectives.
The influence of harmonization in reshaping U.S. copyright law has been
evident for decades. Beginning with the Copyright Act of 1976' and continuing
through a series of amending statutes, several fundamental changes in the law
result directly from the .press for harmonization.' This transition is often
manifest in compliance with multinational treaties.' For example, the United
States joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works6 in 1989, which mandated several changes.7 An unwillingness to adopt
those changes was one major reason for the United States's long delay in
becoming a signatory to that treaty. s Congress anticipated that the United
States eventually would join the treaty and began to make some ofthe required
changes with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.' Congress took
additional and theoretically "final" steps toward treaty compliance with
amendments to the 1976 Act in 1988 and 1990.'0 Yet, pressure for additional
change continues. Some member countries have argued that the United States
has not fully conformed to the requirements ofthe Berne Convention, and in the
meantime, more recent treaties have compelled further restructuring of U.S.

3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
4. Although the actual statutory changes of importance in this Article began with the Copyright Act of
1976, international developments had been deployed long before to argue for revisions in U.S. law. See, e.g.,
James J. Guinan, Jr., Duration of Copyright, Study No. 30, Copyright Law Revision, Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1961), at 62-70 (examining efforts in Congress, beginning in 1922, to revise U.S. law
to conform with requirements of the Berne Convention).
5.. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,36 I.L.M.
65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]; World Intellectual Property Organization Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereineafter WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty]. For a general discussion of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, see
Rebecca F. Marin, The WIPO PerformancesandPhonogramsTreaty: Will the US. Whistle a New Tune?
44 J. CopyiuGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 157 (1997).
6. Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised Paris, July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention is a
multinational treaty, with 130 signatory countries as ofMay 1998. See U.S. Copyright Office, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNrrED STATES, Circular 38a (1998). It fundamentally provides for mutual
protection of copyrighted works in each country and sets substantive standards that the laws of each country
must meet.
7. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
8. Belanger, supra note 1, at 375.
9. See supratext accompanying notes 3-4.
10. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. See also
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
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copyright law."
I. "HARMONIZATION" AND THE REVISION OF U.S. LAW

Numerous examples of change in U.S. law are attributable to
harmonization. The pressure for international conformity has altered the means
for acquiring copyright, has restructured the term of copyright duration, and has
brought new protection under U.S. law where no legal rights previously existed.
The process of defining the conditions of harmonization also has generated
some awkward results. New forms of protection sometimes extend only to
certain works and apply only in narrow and ill-defined contexts. The quest for
international harmonization has resulted in greater protection under U.S. law for
foreign works than for domestic works. The transition from previous law to
"harmonized" law has generated clumsy juxtapositions of legal doctrines,
reflecting a collision ofcultural and economic objectives that underlie copyright.
Most of all, the drive toward greater harmonization has produced copyright law
that simply drifts from its constitutional purposes, often generating results that
are more complicated and at times divergent from the ideal of an international
standard. 2
A. RestructuredTerm of Copyright Protection
With the passage of the 1976 Act, Congress altered the term of protection
for copyrighted works from a term of twenty-eight years, renewable for twentyeight additional years, 3 to a term of life of the author, plus fifty years.' 4
Statistically, the "life-plus-fifty" term was not significantly longer than the
prescribed term of seventy-five years under the previous law. 5 Thus, the
revision in 1976 did not greatly alter the average length of a copyright's

11. A principal treaty leading to most recent pressure for statutory change is the WIPO Copyright Treaty.

See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 5. For a discussion of some of the Treaty's implications, see infratext
accompanying notes 74-77.
12. Belanger, supra note 1,at 390 (arguing that the expanded scope of rights required under the Berne
Convention exceeds "that necessary to promote the public dissemination of private works").
13. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998)).
14. CopyrightAct of 1976,17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998). More recently, Congress extended thatprotection
to the life of the author, plus seventy years. For a discussion of that development, see infra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text.
15. James J.Guinan, Jr., Durationof Copyright,Study No. 30, Copyright Law Revision, Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1961), at 76 (referring to a 1930 study that protection for "life-plus-fifty" would

result in an average term of protection of between 76 and 86 years).
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duration. The restructuring of the term was, however, a direct result of the
Berne Convention that the United States was preparing tojoin in 1976.16 More
importantly, the 1976 law brought a new term of copyright that would assure
protection for the author's life, as well as for the subsequent generation. Under
the previous Copyright Act of 1909, protection in the United States had been
for an initial term of twenty-eight years plus a renewal for twenty-eight, not
forty-seven, additional years.17 In 1962, Congress began an incremental process
of"ad interim" protection, eventually extending copyright for existing works to
a term oftwenty-eight plus forty-seven years."8 Congress specifically instituted
that change to create a term of protection roughly equivalent to the number of
years that one would have under a "life-plus-fifty" system.
The relative merit of basing copyright duration on a defined, albeit
unrenewable, term versus a term determined by an author's life, is a policy
question open to continued debate. 9 Arguments for a term based on the
author's life clearly have had the greatest influence on copyright laws around
the world. In making the transition away from a fixed term, the United States
generally applied the "life-plus-fifty" rule only to works coming into existence
on or after January 1, 1978, and retained the fixed term for most other existing
copyrights.2 ° Consequently, pre-1978 publications are generally protected for
a maximum of seventy-five years; later works are protected for life-plus-fifty.2'
Congress was not prepared to alter fundamentally the duration of existing
copyrights.2 As a result, U.S. copyright law today embodies both systems for

16. In particular, the 1976 Act added new §§ 302-304 related to the term of protection. Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
17. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1946).
18. The first step in this process was a 1962 enactment that extended existing copyrights until the end of
1965. Congress continued to renew those copyrights every I or2 years. Until enactment of the Copyright Act
of 1976. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
19. Author Samuel Clemens made an impassioned plea for copyright that should last at least for the
author's life and some ensuing years. He testified before Congress in 1906 about the agony of living long
enough to see some of his early works lapse into the public domain and ofthe desire to provide for his offspring.
See Margolit Fox, The Rights of Writers as a Twain Obsession in a Rediscovered Manuscript; Wisdom
Seeker and Statesman Spar, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1998, at El.
20. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994). Although U.S. law was revised in 1976, the new
law did not take effect until January 1, 1978. Hence, that date is pivotal in reference to significant changes in
copyright standards. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598-99 (1976).
21. This statement can only be made generally. Consistent with the Berne Convention, a fixed term of
protection applies to works made for hire. In the United States, the term of protection is either 95 years from
the date of publication or 120 years from creation, whichever occurs first. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994)).
22. Restructuring existing copyrights by converting them from a fixed term to aterm based on the author's
life could in many instances have disruptive effects on existing agreements for the exploitation of the works.
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measuring the term of copyright protection.
The effort to eliminate confusion by establishing an international standard
instead has complicated the standard even further in the United States. To
calculate the length ofa copyright in the United States, one must first determine
whether the work was created before or after January 1, 1978, a potentially
difficult task.23 Furthermore, the revision of U.S. copyright in 1976
restructured the term ofprotection for existing unpublished works.24 The 1976
Act preempted the common-law copyright that previously had given
unpublished works perpetual copyright protection as long as they remained
unpublished. The pre- 1978 protection of up to seventy-five years applied to the
work only upon its publication.
Congress, in 1976, replaced the common-law rule with protection for
unpublished works based on the life of the author, plus fifty years. Thus,
unpublished works created before 1978 are protected for a term dependent on
the author's life, while works published before 1978 are under copyright for the
maximum fixed term of seventy-five years. Determining the duration of
copyright thus requires identifying whether the work ever has been published .25
The quest for copyright information depends on an increasing array of facts,

For example, in the mid- 1970s a purchaser of a copyright may have forecast investments in the work based on
an expectation of at least 75 years of protection. A conversion to aterm based on the author's life could shorten
the duration, ifthe author should die shortly after creating the work. Similarly, the author may have negotiated
a price for the copyright based on an expectation of 75 years of rights, but if the author lives longer than 25
years, the author may have underestimated the price. On the other hand, Congress has extended the term of
protection on various occasions, notably after 1962 when duration was effectively extended from 56 to 75 years.
See supranote 18. To adjust for that windfall of continued protection, Congress gave to the original copyright
owner, or heirs, a right to terminate the transfer of the copyright. Thus, an early transfer of the copyright based
on an assumption of 56 years of protection could still be limited to last only 56 years. Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994). Congress could possibly have alleviated some ofthe concerns aboutconverting the
duration of the existing copyright by providing a similar termination right and a minimum term of 75 years for
existing copyrights. A second type of conflict with restructuring the duration of existing copyrights is a
constitutional restriction. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stipulates: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Any redefinition of copyright's
protection that could result in a shortening of existing duration could be construed as a violation of the "takings
clause" of the Fifth Amendment. Again, assurance of at least 75 years for pre-1978 works may have avoided
that pitfall.
23. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, How TO INVESTIGATE THE COPYRIGHT STATUS OF A WORK, Circular 22,
at 7 (1995).
24. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994).
25. It is actually even more complex than this brief summary suggests. In the case of pre-1978
unpublished works, for example, protection continues through December 31,2002, regardless of the date ofthe
author's death. Further, if the work is published before December 31,2002, copyright continues for at least an
additional 45 years through December 31, 2047. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §
102(c), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994)).
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many of which are difficult or impossible to isolate. Those facts may include
the place of creation of the work,2 6 the date of creation,27 the date of
publication,2" whether it is a work made for hire,29 and the date of the author's
death.3" One must also determine whether an apparently unpublished document
in fact has been published at any time and in any form.3" Discovering those
basic facts can require extensive research.32
The restructured term of copyright protection is an essential part of the
harmonization of copyright, and it is designed to make the law consistent and
more predictable. But the restructured term has not meshed well with U.S. law,
leaving the duration of copyright protection under U.S. law distinctly
"unharmonized" and vastly more complex. The complexity of a dual system of
duration may continue under existing law as long as copyrights vested before
1978 exist. Since most of those copyrights previously lasted for seventy-five
years, the dual system was extended to last until 2053, seventy-five years after
1978. 33 This Article will later examine the recent successful effort to extend
copyright by twenty years.34 Because the extension has become law, the
"temporary" transition will now last until at least 2073.

26. if the work originated in a country that is not a party to the Berne Convention or another treaty, it may
have no copyright protection in other countries. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
27. As already analyzed, the term of protection under U.S. law differs, depending on whether the work
was created before or after January 1, 1978. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
28. Under pre- 1978 law, the fixed term of protection began only upon publication. Further, if a work was
created before 1978, but published after the effective date of the new law, the work may receive the additional
forty-five years of protection. See Copyright Term Extension Act,.Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(c), 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994)).
29. A "work made for hire" is, in general, a work created by an employee within the scope of employment.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). In that event, the copyright belongs to the employer, and the
term of protection is either ninety-five years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date ofcreation,
whichever occurs first. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994)). Determining whether a work is one made for hire clearly provides for
a term of protection that breaks from the general contemporary rule of "life-plus-fifty," or "life-plus-seventy"
under the newly extended term.
30. If a copyright lasts for a period of years following the author's death, the author's basic obituary
information becomes crucial.
3 1. For example, a researcher has possession in 1999 of a manuscript letter by an author who died in
1890. The copyright may not have expired, because the rule of life-plus-seventy for such works does not take
effect until 2003. On the other hand, if the work had been properly published in 1900, even if the researcher
is not aware of that publication, the copyright expired at the latest in 1995. Another possibility is that the heirs
published the letter in 1990. In that event, the copyright lasts until at least 2048. Researching these possibilities
for publication is crucial for the scholar who may want to use that letter in a book or other work.
32. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 23.
33. See Tung Tin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Section 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 17 LoV. L.A. ENr. L.J. 383, 383 (1997).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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B. Limited Requirement of CopyrightFormalities
The requirement of executing certain formalities in order to secure
protection, at least for published works, had been a long-standing fixture of
U.S. copyright law before 1978. Under pre-1978 law, those formalities were
the inclusion of a copyright notice on published works and registration of the
work with the U.S. Copyright Office.35 These requirements were antithetical to
the standards of the Berne Convention.3" With passage of the 1976 Act,
37
Congress began phasing out the notice and registration requirements,
ultimately eliminating them as requirements for copyright protection in 1989
when the United Statesjoined the Berne Convention.3" Congress, however, did
not eliminate entirely the benefits of formalities.3 9
Registration is often required before filing a copyright infringement lawsuit,
although that registration can occur long after the work is created or even
published; copyright protection still vests automatically.4 As a practical
matter, registration is necessary for copyright owners because published works
must still be deposited with the Library of Congress,4 and the process of
depositing the work is little different from formal registration. If the copyright
owner goes to the trouble of depositing the work, he is advised to register the
work at the same time. Moreover, registration prior to an infringement provides
the copyright owner with significant financial remedies in a successful
infringement action.4 The copyright owner can ask the court for "statutory
damages" in lieu of actual damages,43 and the copyright owner may, if
successful, obtain attorneys' fees from the defendant." In many cases, the
inability to secure statutory damages and reimbursement of attorneys' fees
means that a copyright infringement action is economically impossible to

35. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (1946). The 1909 Copyright Act did not specifically
require registration ofpublished works, but the copyright owner did need to deposit two copies ofthe work with
the Library of Congress at the time of publication and file a renewal registration 28 years later. For all practical
purposes, these requirements made registration an expected step at the time ofpublication. See Nimmer, supra
note 2, at 219 n.54.
36. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 380-81 (2d ed. 1995).
37. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2576-83.
38. See Berne Convention, supranote 7.
39. Belanger, supra note I, at 394-95 (arguing that continued requirement of formalities for certain
remedies nevertheless complies with the Berne Convention).
40. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 41 l(a) (1994).
41. Id. § 407.
42. Id. § 412.
43. Id. § 504.
44. Id § 505.
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prosecute. 5 Some critics object that the United States has not fully complied
with the treaty46 because it has made the formalities of notice and registration
a precondition to the practical ability to enforce a copyright. 7
C. Restorationof Foreign Copyrights
While the United States took the most recent step to eliminate the notice and
registration formalities in 1989,48 many other countries long had been
signatories to Berne and had dropped formalities decades before.4 9
Consequently, for example, a French author had not been required to comply
with formalities to obtain protection in France and in many other countries that
already had eliminated the prerequisites. However, once that work had been
exported to the United States, the work entered the public domain in the United
States if it lacked a copyright notice and perhaps registration. 0 The works of
many unsuspecting foreign authors entered the public domain during the

45. A good example of the importance of recovering attorney fees is Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court held that the commercial photocopy shop
infringed the copyrights held by book publishers when it photocopied and sold "course packs" comprising
chapters from various books. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1991). The court awarded the publishers statutory damages in the amount of $510,000,
and Kinko's was required to reimburse the publishers' attorney fees in the amount of$ 1,365,000. Id. Clearly
attorney fees can vastly outstrip damages, and the ability to recover them can determine the feasibility of legal
action. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that either a plaintiff or a defendant may be a"prevailing party"
in an infringement lawsuit and thus allowed under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994), to
request an award of attorney fees. Fogerty v. Fantasy Music, 5 10 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). Timely registration,
however, is a prerequisite to the ability of the copyright owner, not the defendant, to receive this remedy.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994).
46. For critical examinations of current formality requirements under U.S. law, see Irwin Karp, A Future
Without Formalities,13 CARDOZO ARTS & Err. L.J. 521 (1995); Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyrightfrom
Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (1995).
47. To relieve some critics, the requirement of registration before filing a lawsuit does not apply to most
foreign works. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 41 1(a) (1994). On the other hand, registration as a
precondition to statutory damages and attorney fees does not change the fact that the copyright owner has
enforceable rights. John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement: The Repeal of CopyrightRegistrationIncentives, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529, 535 n.33 (1995). Moreover, the previous common-law protection for
unpublished works did not allow recovery of either statutory damages or attorney fees, so registration actually
allows an expansion of rights that did not exist before the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 530
n.10.
48. See Berne Convention, supra note 6.
49. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,

Circular 38a (1998), for a list ofcountries adhering to the Berne Convention, with their dates of accession. See
Nimmer, supranote 2, at228-32 (discussing the conflicts ofcopyright protection that arose during the era when
U.S. law continued to require formalities).
50. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
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decades the United States held fast to formalities. In a striking development that
began with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 5" and was
later expanded by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),52 the
United States was obligated to bring many of those foreign copyrighted works
that had entered the public domain back under copyright protection.53
Effective January 1, 1996, U.S. copyright protection was restored to a
broad range of materials that originated in other countries but, due to
noncompliance with U.S. formalities, had lost protection in the United States.'
The copyright was restored for the remaining term of protection that the works
would otherwise have enjoyed, which was typically a period of seventy-five
years from the date of original publication." Foreign works that were once in
the public domain are now back under copyright. However, U.S. works that
also entered the public domain due to inadequate formalities had to remain in
the public domain. As a result, U.S. law gives stronger copyright protection to
a broader class of foreign works than it gives to similar domestic works. U.S.
law also demands that a researcher identify whether or not the work originated
in the United States in order to determine whether it may still be protected.
Often that seemingly simple information can be extraordinarily difficult to
ascertain.
D. Moral Rights
Moral rights for authors and artists are a European concept56 introduced

51. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
52. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. 1103, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
53. Before the current version of 17 U.S.C. § 104A, Congress enacted a statute in 1993 pursuant to
NAFTA that had a relatively limited application to motion pictures. See North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,107 Stat. 2057,2115(1993). The current statute applies
more broadly to all types of works, as required by GATT. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act,Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,4976(1994). Even before entering into these treaties, the United States arguably was
required to grant retroactive protection to some foreign works under the Berne Convention. Congress apparently
intended not to accept retroactive protection, although it apparently changed that policy in more recent years.
See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 229.
54. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104(A) (1998).
55. Ironically, the protection for 75 years is still not true "harmonization." Many other countries long ago
adopted a "life-plus-fifty" rule, while in the United States the work is restored to a fixed duration.
56. Arthur B. Sackler, The UnitedStates Should not Adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention,3 J.L.
& TECH. 207,209(1988). "The concept of moral rights ... has long been recognized in European and other
countries." Belanger, supra note 1, at 383.
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into U.S. copyright law in a most minimalistic manner solely to comply with
Berne Convention obligations." Moral rights in the United States give an artist
of certain "works of visual arts" 8 the right to preserve his or her name on copies
of works,59 as well as the right to have the artist's name removed if an owner of
the copy alters it in ways objectionable to the artist.' Moral rights also give
artists of certain works the ability to prevent the owner of the copy from
destroying it. 6' Authors and artists in the United States did not have these rights
before the enactment of moral rights provisions in 1990.62 The result has been
a distinct expansion of the scope of rights, at least for a narrow class of works.
E. Bootleg Sound Recordings
While moral rights were a new form of right for some copyrighted works,
treaty requirements also extended U.S. legal protection to works that previously
lacked copyright protection altogether. The lack of legal protection for bootleg
recordings of musical performances is a surprising void, making this revision
perhaps the most sympathetic of all changes in U.S. law described in this
Article. An unauthorized sound recording of a performance, due to a quirk in
U.S. copyright law and constitutional interpretation, had previously lacked
copyright protection for the performer. The person making the recording was
not responsible for the original performance captured on tape, and thus had
contributed no "originality" to the work. The performer had not authorized the
recording and consequently was not the one "fixing" the performance onto the

57. Belanger, supra note 1, at 383.
58. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101(1998) (defining "work of visual art").
59. Id.§ 106A(a) (explaining the right of paternity or attribution).
60. Id.
61. Id; See Martinv. Indianapolis,982 F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997), for a leading case on this issue.
62. Belanger, supranote 1,at 399 (noting that moral rights are the "most significant" area in which the
United States continues to fail to meet the requirements of the Beme Convention).
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tape.63 Hence, that recording was not the work ofthe performer or the recorder.
Protection for such a sound recording often fell into a legal void. The existence
of that void was inconsistent with the laws of most other countries and with
multinational treaty requirements."
The United States now provides legal protection for the performers, giving
them the ability to bring action against persons who make and distribute bootleg
recordings. 5 However, that protection is not "copyright" law. Rather, it is
protection enacted by Congress under either its commerce or treaty powers6 but
it applies the remedies given to a copyright owner under the Copyright Act.67
It is for all practical purposes copyright protection for unauthorized sound
recordings, but enacted by Congress under its other powers found in the U.S.
Constitution, thereby avoiding the rigors of the Copyright Clause.68
F. DatabaseProtection
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty of
1996 provides that databases shall be protected, 69 a declaration that, in many
applications, defies established U.S. copyright law. In 1991, the U.S. Supreme

63. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1998). The definition of "fixed" provides that a work
eligible for copyright must be fixed "by or under the authority of the author." Id.A bootleg recording is not
made with the authority of the copyright owner of the composition or the performer. The U.S. Constitution
empowers Congress to grant protection onlyto "authors" for "their writings." U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8. The
power may not encompass "writings" that are "fixed" by someone other than the "author." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The issue of bootleg recordings deals largely with the interests of the performer of a musical composition. If
the composition existed in a "fixed" version, whether as a musical score or as a separate recording, before the
performance that was "bootlegged," the composer most certainly has copyright protection for the composition.
Hence, the composer could take action against many uses of the bootlegged recording, while the performer
would not have any rights under previous law. The new statute gives rights to the performer. Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1998).
64. See Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That: A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a
Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595
(1996).
65. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1998). One critic notes that because the anti-bootlegging
statute is technically separate from the basic regime of copyright protection, itis not necessarily subject to the
limited term of protection and offers "potentially perpetual protection." Jaszi, supra note 64, at 603.
66. U.S. CONsT.art. I, § 8, cl.
3 & art. VI; Jaszi, supranote 64, at 605 (referencing the Commerce Clause
as the source of congressional power).
67. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1998).
68. Jaszi, supranote 64, at 602. "While dealing with a creative activity, which has been acknowledged
to represent a form of authorship, the anti-bootlegging provisions go beyond what Congress could do if it were
legislating under the Patent and Copyright Clause." Id.
69. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5. "Compilations of data or other material, in any form,
which by reason of the selection or arrangement oftheir contents constitute intellectual creations, are protected
as such." Id.
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Court ruled as a constitutional matter that copyright law could not protect
compilations of data that were not selected, arranged, or coordinated in some
original manner." The database in the 1991 case, an alphabetical telephone
listing, was merely an unoriginal compilation of unprotectable facts, and it
could have no copyright protection.7 Many other countries provide protection
for such databases and saw the U.S. decision in FeistPublications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. to be an anomaly that left many databases
in the public domain. Such databases still lack protection in the United States,
and U.S. copyright law cannot encompass them.7" In an exercise of
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, proposals in Congress
would have extended sui generis legal rights for databases where copyright
ends.73 Once again, treaty obligations have compelled the prospect of change
in intellectual property law. In this instance, the change is potentially in direct
contravention of a constitutional decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. THE CONTINUING MARCH OF HARMONIZATION
The march of harmonization continues with additional new legislation and
further treaty negotiations.74 One direct example of this development is the right
to secure "copyright management information" (CMI) and "copyright protection
systems" (CPS) pursuant to the WIPO treaty.75 These additions to U.S.
copyright law do not come without controversy. The statutes that now
authorize copyright owners to place technological controls and to prescribe
regulatory information in connection with the access to and dissemination of
protected works also impose severe penalties on individuals who circumvent or
remove the controls on that information. Those penalties would apply even if

70. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
71. According to the Supreme Court, the alphabetical telephone listing was a "garden variety" listing that
lacked "some minimal degree of creativity." Id. at 362.
72. The Feistdecision is based on a constitutional requirement for U.S. copyright protection, and hence
an Act of Congress pursuant to the Copyright Clause cannot overturn it. See id. at 363-64.
73. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong., tit. 5 (1998) (Title 5 is entitled
"Collections of Information Antipiracy Act"); Collections ofInformation Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, 105th Cong.
(1998); See Jaszi, supra note 64, at 605 (questioning the constitutionality of the database legislation).
74. At least one piece of legislation from recent years, offered with the objective oftreaty compliance, has
died with little prospect for reintroduction. A bill in 1993 would have eliminated the requirement of registration
as a precondition to filing a lawsuit and securing certain remedies. See supranotes 35-45 and accompanying
text. See Koegel, supra note 47, for a critical examination of the bill.
75. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11, 12; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. Title 12).
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a user were to take actions in order to utilize the resources in a manner
consistent with fair use or other legal rights to use copyrighted works.76 Thus,
while the law explicitly states that the addition of CMI and CPS does not affect
the exercise of fair use, copyright owners may unilaterally impose regulatory
devices that could restrict uses more narrowly than would be within the
framework of existing fair use, exposing a user to legal liability for bypassing
CMI or CPS in pursuit of the lawful exercise of fair use." Fair use may
continue to apply to works once they are lawfully accessed, but the copyrighted
works will, as a practical matter, be locked behind secured devices and software
blocks. Access may also be limited by contractual obligations that could limit
fair use.
Another development in U.S. law is the recent, successful effort to extend
the term of copyright protection. The Copyright Term Extension Act adds
twenty years of protection to the current copyright duration provided under the
law.7" This new law extends that term to life of the author plus seventy years.
The bill would add twenty years to almost all works, including works made for
hire and unpublished manuscripts originating before 1978.
The impetus for this development grows largely out of a similar extension
of the term adopted by many countries. 9 The term of "life-plus-seventy" has
been advanced as the appropriate standard for all members of the European
Union."0 This change in U.S. law is not required under any treaty or other
obligation on the part of the United States. It is simply an effort to "harmonize
up" with the laws of other countries in order to provide maximum protection for
U.S. copyrights in those other countries. It is also a tremendous windfall of
twenty additional years of protection for all new works, particularly for existing

76. Considerable controversy about the survival of fair use surrounds the new law. The law does include
provisions that explicitly provide for the preservation of fair use, but it does allow restrictions on access to
copyrighted works, even if that access is for lawful purposes, such as fair use. See Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. Title 12).
77. The bill as passed by Congress does include provisions that ostensibly preserve fair use. See, e.g.,
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at
17 U.S.C. Title 12).
78. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
79. See Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Durationof Copyright in the United States and
European Union: Procedureand Policy,6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579 (1996); Shauna
Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Extension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed
Legislationin the UnitedStates, 37 HARV. INT'LL.J. 525 (1996); Jerome N. Epping, Harmonizingthe United
States and European Community Copyright Terms: NeededAdjustment or Money for Nothing, 65 U. CIN.
L. REv. 183 (1996).
80. Directive on Harmonizing the Term of Protection ofCopyright and Certain Related Rights, Council
Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L290/9).
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U.S. works that may otherwise have been on the verge of entering the public
domain.'
These developments, often in the name of harmonization, are supported by
some compelling arguments. Indeed, the arguments in favor of change have
been sufficiently persuasive in the negotiation of treaties, the ratification of
treaties by the U.S. Senate, the enactment of amendments to the Copyright Act
by both the House and the Senate ofthe U.S. Congress, and the signing of those
bills into law by the President of the United States. Passage by Congress of the
latest bills, designed to implement the WIPO Treaties and extend the term of
copyright, are merely the latest evidence of the pressure for harmonization.
Arguments in favor of passage center largely on economic implications."
For example, the extended term of protection may generate twenty more years
of commercial revenue for many economically viable works. Much of that
revenue may come from foreign countries where many novels, motion pictures,
and other U.S. works from the early twentieth century continue to find a market.
The economic argument translates not only into greater revenues for U.S.
copyright holders, but also into the subsequent tax revenues, employment
prospects, and shareholder profits that accompany expanded business.
Moreover, if those revenues are derived from foreign markets, the strengthened
protection and longer term of protection for copyrights may also help shift the
balance of international trade in favor of the United States.
Many of the arguments in favor of these changes also exacerbate tensions
among property claims, the rights of creators, and the public rights of use. For
example, one basic principle of copyright is the separation of the work from its
copyright. 3 An artist, for example, may create and sell a painting. Unless
otherwise agreed, the buyer owns only the object; the copyright and its
appurtenant privileges remain with the artist. One outgrowth of this legal
construct is that the buyer has property rights with respect to the painting and
may treat the physical object in almost any manner chosen, including further
resale or even destruction of the work, whether the work is a painting, book,
videotape, or other copyrighted work. However ill-advised destruction may be,

81. Indeed, concerns about imminent expiration of some major works from the 1920s and 1930s have
motivated the Gershwin estate and the Disney companies to be major proponents of term extension. Steve
Zeitlin, Editorial, Strangling Culture with a Copyright Law, N.Y.TMF.S, Apr. 25, 1998, at AI5.
82. One strong critic of term extension presented his arguments at hearings before the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee and lamented that his points were overwhelmed by the more immediate concern of lost
revenue that could result if copyrights were not granted the additional 20 years. See Jaszi, supra note 64, at
598.
83. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1998).
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it is consistent with traditions of property ownership. Burning a book may
carry historical or social stigma, but it is the right of the book owner."4 The
granting of moral rights, however, conflicts with those traditions of private
property. One may still bum or discard a book, regardless of its value or
uniqueness, but if the owner of a "work of visual art" sends that work to its
demise, the owner may face damage claims payable to the artist.8 5 Perhaps
more pragmatic for modem industry, a representative of a major publishing
company argued strongly against adoption of moral rights in U.S. law because
of its potential interference with the ability of publishers to crop photographs
and edit writing. 6 While the version of moral rights eventually adopted in the
United States extends only to certain works of "visual arts," this layer of rights
belongs to artists and other creators of new works. Therefore, even ifthe editor
properly obtains consent from the copyright owner, the moral rights
nevertheless may well belong to yet another party. Editors, publishers, and
others would need to redouble their efforts by obtaining clearances from both
the copyright owner and the original artist. 7

84. This writer is hardly an enthusiastic supporter of burning books, and indeed has been an active
proponent of the preservation of historical materials. One might also argue that a limitation on the right to
destroy a copyrighted work may be consistent with efforts to preserve historical buildings and other architectural
sites. Often when a site is identified for historical preservation, the owner is prevented by law from destroying
or altering the building. The social objectives of such law are laudable. On the other hand, historical
preservation is fundamentally different from moral rights. For example, moral rights are legal rights that belong
only to the individual creator, while rights to prevent destruction of historical buildings are enforceable by
governmental authorities. Further, moral rights, at least in the United States, last only for the life of the artist,
while preservation restrictions last indefinitely. Consequently, preservation restrictions may in fact limit free
exercise of property rights. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding the constitutionality of preservation laws). However, they do so in a manner that is more clearly
directed at serving a broader public objective, rather than a personal one.
85. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1998).
86. Sackler, supra note 56, at 207-08.
87. Ironically, one major argument against adoption of moral rights was that it would require additional
time and expense, burdening the decisions made by publishers and editors: "[E]ditors can afford neither the time
to obtain consent for specific uses of works nor to hesitate on decisions out of concern that they may
subsequently be second-guessed in litigation." Sackler, supranote 56, at 208. See also Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, How FineArt FaresPost VARA, I MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) ("When the United States
joined Berne in 1988, the entertainment and publishing industries vehemently opposed the adoption of specific
moral rights legislation."). Publishers have strongly rejected similar arguments from educators and librarians
seeking to make "fair use" of existing publications. See, e.g., Carol Risher, Libraries, Copyright and the
Electronic Environment (Barcelona, Apr. 1996) (position paper on behalf of the International Publishers
Copyright Council of the IPA 25' Congress, on file with the Copyright Management Center at Indiana
University-Purdue University Indianapolis). The Sackler article also objects to the need to give attribution to
the creators in addition to the copyright owner. Sackler, supra note 56, at 208. Again, publishers generally
have insisted that educators and librarians include formal notices on any"fair use" copies, even though nothing
in the "fair use" law requires attribution.
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Other changes in copyright law in the name of "harmonization" also defy
deeper principles ofproperty ownership. Rights of free alienation are generally
secured by the "first-sale" doctrine of copyright law,8" which allows the owner
of a lawful copy to pass that copy to others by sale, gift, or rental. The WIPO
Copyright Treaty of 1996, by contrast, calls for some curtailment of leasing
certain works.89 This right to lend, lease, or transfer ownership of copies of
protected works has not been unlimited under recent U.S. law. For example, in
1990, Congress revised the "first-sale" statute' to preclude the commercial
rental or lending of computer programs or sound recordings of musical works.9
The WIPO treaty, however, could allow federal law to add further restrictions
on sales, rentals, or even loans of books, videotapes, and other works.
III. HARMONIZATION AND THE HARM TO PUBLIC INTEREST
Despite the pragmatic and economic arguments in favor of recent
developments in U.S. copyright law, many changes have provided benefits
ultimately to only a small number of individuals at the expense of a large
segment of the U.S. public. U.S. copyright law is built on a principle of social
policy that attempts to find a balance between granting rights of ownership and
control to copyright owners and tempering those rights with a number of
exceptions or "limitations" reserved to the public to make socially constructive
uses of copyrighted works under limited circumstances.' That balance between
private rights and social utility is critical to U.S. copyright law and is implicit
in the social objectives of the law as provided in the constitutional clause
empowering Congress to make copyright law: "The Congress shall have Power
...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."93 Congress has the power to grant rights to copyright owners,
but only if the measure of rights granted is apportioned to serve the overall
objective of advancing knowledge and learning. If the grant of rights is too

88. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1998).
89. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 5, art. 7.
90. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1998).
91. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134-35 (codified as
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 109(bX 1XA) (1998)).
92. Netanel, supra note 2, at 220. "[C]opyright's constitutive, democratic purpose is both a primary
rationale for according authors proprietary rights in original expression and the proper standard for delimiting
those rights." Id
8.
93. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.
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broad or too rigid, then the public's ability to utilize protected works and to
build on and to learn from them is unduly constrained.
Few of the recent changes in U.S. copyright law that have added to the
rights of the copyright owner include any measure of corresponding balance of
rights for the public.94 One fundamental reason for that lack of balance may
simply be that these changes reflect an effort to harmonize U.S. law with laws
originating in foreign countries where copyright law is not rooted in the same
social principles and the same quest for a balancing of rights. Many Western
European countries have stronger rights of private property and copyright
ownership along with fewer rights regarding fair use than have been customary
in the United States. Harmonizing U.S. law with such legal traditions might
result in developments lacking the balance of public interest that has been a
hallmark of U.S. law.
A trend of harmonization that adds predominately to the rights of the
copyright owners without a corresponding balance of public rights promises
fundamental change in U.S. copyright law at a high cost to the public. First,
any expansion of scope or duration of protection is, by necessity, a
corresponding contraction of the public domain. Loss of the public domain,
even a partial loss, is a loss of one of the few clear opportunities for a member
of the public to build upon existing works and to expand upon the base of
creative resources available in the marketplace. Sometimes that member ofthe
public is an individual acting alone or is a business executive seeking maximum
profits and in turn contributing to the broader economy. Novels, for example,
on which the copyrights have expired, have become available to the public as
inexpensive reprints, public television serials, and major Hollywood motion
pictures. The public domain is a valuable resource for individuals seeking
affordable access to works and for large companies seeking to profit by
bringing those works to market either in their original forms or in new media.9"

94. Even more distressing than the lack of any broad limitation for public benefit is the inclusion in the
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), of an exemption for the public
performance of music and other works in restaurants, taverns, and other business establishments. The wisdom
or appropriateness of such an exemption is beyond the scope of this Article, and it is not a new concept. It
expands upon an existing provision. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994). The distress,
however, isfound in the congressionaljustification forthat exemption, with some members ofCongress arguing
that it provides the essential protection for the public interest to balance against the windfall for private parties
that would come from the additional 20 years ofcopyright. 144 Cong. Rec. H1457 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). It is true that the existing §110 of the Copyright Act presents a litany of
important limitations on owner rights, but a benefit for one class of commercial uses is far from adequate to
compensate for the strain on the public interest generated by term extension.
95. For example, the Disney Company, which strongly supports term extension, has benefitted greatly
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Second, the trend toward tightened copyright protection harms the public
good by narrowing the exercise of fair use.96 Fair use is a crucial element of the
U.S. copyright system that allows limited uses of protected works in furtherance
of the constitutional objectives. Fair use is not free use, and it is not an
unrestricted opportunity to exploit unwilling copyright owners. Some copyright
owners do object to some claims of fair use. However, fair use is essential not
only to the public seeking to build on existing works, but also for the creation
of the next generation of many new copyright-protected works. If new legal
structures constrict fair use, the public loses opportunities to benefit from
intellectual works in many creative ways, and the next generation of copyright
owners is inhibited from using a previous generation of material as a fresh
foundation.
A third consequence is undue restriction on the deployment of new
technologies. The success of many new technologies, from the photocopier to
the' Internet, depends on the ability to utilize copyright protected materials in
ways that raise questions about the possibility of infringement. The photocopier
can reproduce copyrighted works; the VCR can play videotapes; the Internet
can transmit or distribute digital works. The availability of the technology is
alone hardlyjustification for revising copyright laws to allow full utilization of
all technology. However, the advance of technologies is crucial for economic
and social progress. Many of the recent developments in photo reproduction,
telecommunications, and computer networking are central to enhanced
communications, greater efficiency of commercial activity, and the growth of
major industries. Much of the domestic and international economy today
depends on a successful application of these technologies for the growth of
business and for the exploration of new commercial opportunities. Just as the
motion picture and publishing industries might argue that stronger copyright
protection can reinforce their businesses and have strong positive consequences
for the economy, so could the computer and technology industries argue that
greater opportunities for reproduction and transmission of copyrighted works
can make new technologies more useful, more valuable, and consequently of
from the public domain. Disney's 1996 movie, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, to cite one example, is a
motion picture based on an 1831 novel by Victor Hugo. Without the expiration of the original work, Disney
would have canceled its project or have paid handsome royalties to the Hugo estate.
96. In furtherance of GATT the United States and numerous other countries entered into the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1199 (also known as
TRIPS), and established the World Trade Organization. TRIPS allows fair use and other exceptions to the
rights of the copyright owners, but only under narrow circumstances, possibly invalidating some of the
applications of fair use in recent U.S. court rulings. Netanel, supra note 2, at 309-10.

1998]

HARMONIZATION AND THE GOALS OF COPYRIGHT

greater importance to the economy.
A fourth consequence for the public, resulting from restrictions, is the
diminished ability to share or disseminate protected works. If teachers are
barred from using materials in the classroom, leaders are constrained from
sharing materials at public functions, and cultural programs are prohibited from
performing or otherwise making works available to an audience, then the public
is simply denied exposure to creative works. That lack of exposure translates
into a loss of learning opportunities and a curtailment of cultural progress.
Those restrictions may arise from longer copyright protection, new forms of
enforceable legal rights, imposition of binding technological controls on access,
and automatic grants of copyright protection for all works, regardless of the
author's intent.97
CONCLUSION: HARMONIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT

Change is inevitable in any area of the law. Changes allow the law to adapt
to new social demands and expectations and enable the law to be responsive to
contemporary forces, whether political or technological. Critical examinations
of copyright law and periodic revisions are essential. The problem with many
of the recent changes in U.S. copyright law is that they are motivated
overwhelmingly by the pressure for harmonization with the laws of other
countries, rather than by the belief that the changes will produce better law.
Especially lost in the recent debates over copyright has been any focus on the
public interest and the constitutional foundation of copyright: to advance the
growth of knowledge and learning.
That shift from the constitutional foundation of copyright represents the
most problematic consequence of harmonization. The U.S. Constitution
empowers Congress to make copyright law within the context of a social
objective: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Historically,
that clause has compelled an evaluation of the effect of copyright law, as well
as any revisions and interpretations, in light of a tension that is inherent in the
struggle over rights to intellectual property: identifying the scope ofrights that

97. Reduced need for registration ofworks jeopardizes the completeness and integrity ofthe registration
records at the U.S. Copyright Office. See Koegel, supranote 47 at 538. It could also undermine the system
of legal deposit of materials for addition to the collection of the Library of Congress. See Kenneth D. Crews,
Legal Depositin FourCountries: Laws and Library Services, 80 L. LIBR. J. 551 (1988). Legal deposit under
American law is today required by statute, separate from any requirement of registration. See Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1994).
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ought to belong to the owner of the work, while tempering those rights to grant
public rights of use in order to encourage productive uses of existing works.98
A prominent example of that tension, as addressed in recent years, is the Feist
decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991

.

In Feist,the Court held that

standard white-pages telephone directories were not sufficiently creative to be
eligible for copyright protection. In so holding, the Court also rejected the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine that had emerged in some lower courts. By that
rule, copyright would vest in a work if time, money, or energy were expended.
The Justices recognized that rejection ofthe "sweat" doctrine wouldjeopardize
copyright for numerous, works that are the product of investment but lack
creativity. The Court made clear that while such a result may seem inequitable,
it is crucial for serving the objectives of copyright.
Despite that strong endorsement from the Supreme Court for the
constitutional objectives of copyright, Congress is taking steps toward
enactment of database protection legislation that would provide protection for
noncreative compilations of data that the Feistdecision found inappropriate for
copyright and its appurtenant rights. t" While the Supreme Court focused on the
social objectives ofthe law, Congress has taken deliberate steps to serve instead
commercial interests.
Similarly, recent legislation in the name of harmonization would test the
constitutional power of Congress to grant copyrights for "limited times" as the
copyright term continues to expand from the original maximum oftwenty-eight
years to a term of seventy years beyond the life of the author.' Congress has
confronted the constitutional limits on protections for bootleg recordings with
new legislation, and it has tested traditional doctrines of property rights by
giving artists moral rights regarding some of their visual works.
These changes represent not only a shift in the philosophical foundation of
copyright and related law, but also a shift in the constitutional foundation for
congressional measures. Congress is adopting legislation that, in many

98. Jaszi, supra note 64,at 596 (warning that "constitutionally-grounded arguments for limitations on
proprietary rights will become irrelevant in tomorrow's intellectual property debates").
99. See supratext accompanying notes 70-72 for a discussion of Feist.
100. See supratext accompanying notes 69-73 for a discussion of the database legislation.
101. See Dennis S.Karjala, Comment of US. Copyright Law Professorson the Copyright Office Term
ofProtectionStudy, 16 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 531 (1994) (highly critical ofextending the term of protection
and contests its constitutionality); see also Joseph A. Lavigne, ForLimited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer
Via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 311 (1996); J.H. Reichman, An
Evaluationof the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of
CulturalPolicy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996).
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respects, functions similarly to copyright law, but it is instead relying on either
the Treaty Clause or the Commerce Clause for authority. Under the Treaty
Clause, Congress can enact legislation consistent with treaties entered into by
the United States, but that legislation may not expand congressional authority
to take action that would contradict the U.S. Constitution. I Through the last
several decades, the Commerce Clause has become an expansive source of
congressional authority for enacting diverse legislation that concerns almost any
activity affecting more than one state.'o3
By contrast, the Copyright Clause begins with a statement of policy: that
copyright privileges should be shaped to duly encourage the creation of new
works and to allow limited public uses also for the growth of knowledge.0 4
That policy has been interpreted as a dynamic force shaping copyright law and
defining the boundaries ofcongressional development of copyright statutes.'05
On the other hand, a database bill enacted under commerce powers would not
be required to balance the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the
public; the bill may grant protection to compilations of data that are
constitutionally unprotected under copyright law. The bill may also allow
protection of an indefinite duration, while copyrights are constitutionally
allowed for "limited times." The bill recently in Congress had exactly those
attributes.
These developments in the law reflect not only constitutional, policy, and
philosophical shifts, but they also manifest a steady shift in the identity of the
stakeholders in the shaping of U.S. intellectual property law. Copyright law
protects works such as motion pictures and computer software, a growing
source of domestic employment and revenue as well as foreign trade. The
economic importance of movies, computer programs, and other works has been
a powerful influence shaping U.S. copyright law. Computer technology has
brought inexpensive and efficient means for reproducing and transmitting

102. See Reid v. Covert 354 U.S. 1 (1957). But cf Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (treaties
may establish law that conflicts with state authority).
103. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also United States v. Lopez
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal legislation barring possession ofa gun in the area around a school),
for the isolated recent example ofthe Supreme Court finding that Congress has exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause.
104. "[F]ull compliance with the Berne Convention would shift the balance of U.S. law, arguably placing
an author's rights ahead of the public interest in access to copyrighted works, such compliance would be
unconstitutional." Belanger, supra note 1, at 391.
105. Few, 499 U.S. at 349 (noting that copyright law may produce some results that "seem unfair," but
those results are sometimes a "constitutional requirement").
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protected content to and from any location in the world. The strength of these
industries in the current economy and the ease ofcommitting infringements have
combined to persuade most lawmakers of the need for considerably stronger
protections for intellectual property. The strengthened rights, however, are
often without a corresponding right of public use-whether that right is fair use
or a clearer establishment of the public domain.
Thus, the economic pressures and the growing international significance of
copyright have led to new law. That new law is overwhelmingly in furtherance
of expanding protection, easier protection, and longer protection. Moral rights,
database protection, technological controls, extended copyrights, eliminated
formalities, and even restored copyrights that were long in the public domain are
symptoms of a legal regime of extraordinary and rapid growth. That growth,
however, has been the direct outcome of legislation reaching beyond the
constitutional limits found in the Copyright Clause and underscored by the
Supreme Court. Congress is also securing greatly strengthened legal rights
without the constitutional policy to balance those rights for the benefit of the
public. The public may well benefit from the economic residuals of legal
strictures, but the public will ultimately lose as cultural and intellectual progress
is increasingly subject to rigorous structures of the law.

